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After Affirmative Action
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN*
Political and constitutional pressure on explicit race preferences in
university admissions may induce some universities to try to increase racial
diversity by race-neutral means such as geographical or socioeconomic
preferences. This Article explores whether such programs should be found
to violate the Equal Protection Clause and concludes that they should not.
True formalists ought not care at all about racially disparate results or
racial purposes associated with laws that, by their term, do not
discriminate on the basis of race. But even those who would inquire into
purposes and effects should defer to laws aimed at increasing racial
diversity by formally race-neutral means. For equal protection cannot
forbid all race-consciousness; it must be understood as forbidding only the
singling out of persons for race-based harm. Under this interpretation,
race-neutral substitutes for affirmative action are constitutional, as any
alteration in the expected white share in admissions opportunities is merely
an incidental byproduct of such programs. But if the purpose of increasing
racial diversity is not inherently racially discriminatory, then even race-
specific admissions criteria should not be conclusively presumed to
discriminate on the basis of race. Thus, the thought experiment of
considering race-neutral proxies for race preferences helps to show why
race preferences themselves may not be suspect after all.
For a generation, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke' has
authorized a compromise in university admissions that the Court has
increasingly foreclosed in the spheres of employment and contracting. So long
as universities act discreetly by treating race as one factor among many in an
admissions file, they may admit members of racial minorities for the sake of
diversity rather than compensation for past wrong. While remedial justifications
have become the predominant, and finally the exclusive but decreasingly
successful, way to preserve affirmative action in the work context,2 higher
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1 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978) (holding that racially preferential admissions that establish a
quota system violate the Equal Protection Clause).
2 See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (plurality opinion)
("'[P]ervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct' justifi[es] a narrowly
tailored race-based remedy."); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-
506 (1989) (plurality opinion) (striking down a municipal plan for race-based minority set-
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education has remained a sphere in which forward-looking functional or
distributive justifications remain constitutionally sufficient, independent of past
sins of discrimination. 3 As Justice Powell's pivotal opinion in Bakke suggests,
racial diversity in the composition of a professional school's classes might well
serve a pedagogical function, bringing epistemic diversity to the classroom in
the form of "experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of [the]
student body." 4 Racial diversity might likewise serve distributive goals by
increasing the incidence and the quality of services rendered by graduates to the
diverse communities from which they came. 5 Nothing in the Powell opinion
suggests that such consequentialist justifications would be any less
constitutionally sufficient at the undergraduate than the graduate level.6
But Bakke's compromise is under deep pressure, caught in a pincer
movement of political and constitutional change. A political backlash against
affirmative action dates back at least to the shift of working-class white
Democrats to the Republican Party in the first Reagan election. Meanwhile, the
Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence has retreated ever further from
an anti-subordination principle toward a color-blindness principle, although the
Court has never quite attained a majority for strict scrutiny of affirmative action
that is truly fatal.7
These waves, at first most visible in the contexts of employment and
contracting, have begun to lap the shores of higher education. It is realistic to
think they might soon gain greater momentum. 8 Suppose, for example, that a
asides of city construction contracts in part because the plan was not "narrowly tailored to
remedy prior discrimination").
3 For a discussion of the distinction between remedial and forward-looking functional or
distributive justifications, see generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last
Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARv. L. REV. 78 (1986)..
4 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
5 See id. at 310-11.
6 See id. at 313.
7 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (seeking to "dispel the notion that strict scrutiny in this
context is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact'" (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring))); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 509 (noting that
"[n]othing we say today precludes a state or local entity from taking action"-including race-
conscious action-"to rectify the effects of identified discrimination within its jurisdiction").
Justice Scalia concurred separately in both Croson and Adarand to emphasize his
disagreement with the Court's failure to embrace a more robust color-blindness principle that
would have authorized no race-conscious measures apart from remedies for "identified
victims of discrimination." Croson, 488 U.S. at 526 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment);
accordAdarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and injudgment).




great many other jurisdictions were to copy the policy of the Board of Regents
of the University of California, banning racial preferences in admissions, 9 or
were to endorse a ban on racial preferences in all public programs, including
education, as California voters did in Proposition 209.10 Or suppose Congress
were to require that all educational institutions, public or private, that receive
public funds forego racial preferences in admissions as a condition of funding.
Or suppose that the Supreme Court were to rule for the nation, as the Fifth
Circuit did for the states within its jurisdiction in Hopwood v. Texas, 11 that
subtle racial preferences in admissions for diversity's sake were no longer
constitutional, as they have been considered for a generation since Bakke.
I. THE PoLITICs OF RACIAL PROXIES
What would the world of higher education look like in the near term if, in
light of such political or constitutional changes, race could no longer be used as
an explicit basis for preferences in university admissions? Here are three
possible scenarios:
1. Resegregation. Assuming a relatively small pool of minority candidates
with grades and test scores equal to or exceeding the lowest grades and test
scores of successful white applicants, one possibility is that university student
bodies would rapidly return to the relatively homogenous white or Anglo
student bodies that characterized them prior to Bakke. There would be
distributional complexities within this trend. For example, so long as private
institutions have more freedom to engage in racial preferences than public
institutions, they might attract the best minority applicants in the national pool,
exacerbating the resegregation effect on public institutions. Within public
university systems, minority enrollment might decline more precipitously at the
more selective schools than at others in the system.12 And some regions might
9 See Susan Yoachum & Edward Epstein, UC Scraps Affirmative Action: Regents' Vote
Gives Wilson Major Victory, S.F. CHRON., July 21, 1995, at Al.
10 See CA. CoNsr. art. I, § 31(a) ("The state shall not discriminate against, or grant
preferential treatment to any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or
national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting.").
11 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
12 SeeThomas J. Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preference in College Admissions, in THE
BLACI-WHrrE TES ScoRE GAP 431 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998),
reprinted in 59 Omo ST. L.J. 971 (1998); see also Pamela Burdman, UC Breathes Sigh of
Relief Over Minority Enrollment, S.F. CHRON., May 21, 1998, at A26 (noting that minority
enrollments decreased at the most selective institutions in the University of California system
but increased at less selective campuses during the first year of the Regents' race-blind
admissions policy).
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have high concentrations of some minorities, such as Asian-Americans, who
were not represented in large numbers prior to Bakke but who now would gain
university admission in numbers relatively proportional to their percentage of
the population. These complexities aside, the basic scenario would be either that
higher education in the aggregate, or elite and flagship institutions in particular,
would suffer a considerable and publicly visible drop in black and Latino
representation as compared with the current levels achieved under racially
preferential admissions policies.
2. Proxies. Assuming that such visible resegregation is politically
intolerable, a second possibility is that universities will seek to achieve some
approximation of the end-state of racial diversity in admissions that they
achieved under Bakke-style policies, or at least mitigate the decline in minority
enrollment, without abandoning altogether their principal traditional criteria for
selection-grades and standardized test scores. In order to do so, they might
employ supplementary admissions criteria that they believe will
disproportionately favor minority applicants.
For example, the Texas legislature, in the aftermath of Hopwood, enacted
legislation requiring public universities in Texas to admit any student who
graduates in the top ten percent of his or her high school class. 13 Given de facto
residential racial segregation in Texas, and, therefore, the sizeable proportion of
high schools with predominantly Mexican-American, and in some areas
African-American, student bodies, such a program virtually guarantees
threshold levels of minority representation among college admittees. Other
institutions, such as UCLA Law School, are experimenting with giving
preferences to some students identified by their relatively low socioeconomic
status within the applicant pool. While some proponents of such measures
regard socioeconomic diversity as independently desirable, 14 others support
such programs, at least in part, hoping that, given the disproportionate
representation of racial minorities among the poor, class-based preferences will
achieve greater racial diversity in incoming classes than would admissions
policies that were both race- and class-neutral. 15
3. Revision of normative criteria for admission. A third possibility is that
13 See Ken Herman, Senate Passes Bill on College Admissions: Governor Expected to
Sign, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 9, 1997, atB1.
14 See generally RicH.AR D. KAHLENBERG, THE REmEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996) (arguing that class-based affirmative action would be preferable
to race-based affirmative action).
15 For a comprehensive account of the UCLA experiment and an assessment of its first
year, see Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 472 (1997). For a skeptical view of class-based affirmative action, whether
race-conscious or race-neutral, see Deborah C. Malarnud, Class-Based Affirmative Action:
Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1847 (1996).
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backlash against the abandonment of race-based affirmative action would help
precipitate a partial or wholesale reevaluation of traditional admissions
standards. For example, colleges might cease to weight grade point averages
(GPAs) to reflect the relative quality of the education given at different high
schools, as Texas's ten percent solution effectively does. 16 Graduate and
professional schools might do the same with respect to undergraduate
institutions, as Boalt Law School at the University of California at Berkeley has
considered doing. 17 Universities might increase the weight given to essays,
interviews, or other more subjective grounds for evaluation and decrease the
weight given to GPAs and standardized test scores. 18 At the outer limit,
universities might even abandon reliance on standardized test scores altogether.
Professional schools might shift focus from inputs to outputs. For example, they
might count favorably an applicant's commitment to serving under-served
communities upon graduation. Or universities might embrace
socioeconomically redistributive admissions policies for their own sake, without
regard to their predicted effect on racial diversity. Even if precipitated initially
by a concern about declining racial diversity, such approaches would ultimately
involve a more wide-ranging, normative revision in the notion of the
university's social role and proper function.
There is strong reason to think that scenarios one and three are so costly
politically as to be unsustainable. The prospect of a return to "'the inexorable
zero,"' as Justice O'Connor once labeled the complete absence of women from
supervisory positions in a public construction project, 19 is daunting in the
context of education, particularly in higher education because of the
significance of college and graduate degrees in providing upward social
mobility. If elite colleges and professional schools lack any significant number
of minority students, they revive the dangerous symbolism of an entrenched,
racially-defined underclass. On the other hand, the erosion or destruction of
traditional indicia of merit risks undermining the privileged status of the
university itself and the willingness of political bodies to support it.20
16 See supra note 13.
17 See UNvTusrry OF CALIFoRNIA SCHOOL OF LAw, BERKELEY, REPORT OF AN AD
HOC TASK FORCE ON DrvERsrrY IN ADmIsSIONS 24-26 (1997).
18 See, e.g., Margaret Y.K. Woo, ReaffinningMerit in Affirmative Action, 47 J. LnEA
EDUC. 514 (1997) (discussing perseverance in overcoming obstacles as a desirable admissions
criterion).
19 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clam County, 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977)).
20 See Sam Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action Be Defeded? 59 OHIo ST. L.J. 669
(1998).
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If this political prediction is correct, then continued pressure to eliminate
race-based preferences in higher education admissions is likely, in the near
term, to produce a variety of efforts of type two: deliberate attempts to achieve
the end of racial diversity indirectly through apparently race-neutral means.
Such efforts raise a number of policy questions: How efficient would they be as
an empirical matter at producing racial diversity?21 Are geographical quotas,
such as Texas's ten percent solution, likely to swamp public colleges and
universities with more admitted students than they can handle? Will minority
students admitted under such programs actually attend college in significant
numbers? Would class-based preferences displace large numbers of more
academically qualified whites in favor of less qualified whites and eliminate
from admission affluent minority students admitted under current policies while
yielding only small numbers of non-affluent minority admittees? These
questions are important and difficult. But I would like to focus on a different,
interpretive question: Would such efforts be held constitutional against an equal
protection challenge?
II. FORM, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT
This question raises a tension between the form, purpose, and effect of laws
that recurs across many areas of constitutional jurisprudence, from First
Amendment to dormant Commerce Clause cases. For example, laws that are
content-based in form are reviewed more strictly under the Free Speech Clause
than laws that are content-neutral,22 but the Court has nonetheless deferred to
laws formally directed at particular speakers or programs when found to serve a
content-neutral purpose.23 This result suggests that the form of the law merely
21 Ainlysts of the UCLA Law School's class-based preference scheme after its first year
agreed that "class-based affirmative action is much less 'efficient' than race-based affirmative
action in selecting minority students." Richard H. Sander, Comment in Reply, 47 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 512, 512 (1997). They disagree about how much. Compare id., and Sander, supra
note 15, with Deborah C. Malamud, A Response to Professor Sander, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC.
504, 504-09 (1997) (arguing that the UCLA experiment did not achieve meaningful racial
diversity); see also Linda F. Wightinan, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An
Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School
Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1997) (arguing that class-based preferences are
not a substitute for race-based preferences).
22 See generally GMZAM GUMrnaa & KATMLEN M. SULUvAN, CONSTrrrMONAL LAW
1203-34 (13th ed. 1997) (discussing various arguments for making a distinction between
content-based and content-neutral laws).
23 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997) ('urner I])
(upholding under intermediate scrutiny a law requiring cable operators to carry broadcast
programming in preference to other video programming); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622 (1994) (Turner I) (holding that a law requiring cable operators to carry
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gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of a permissible or impermissible
purpose, which in turn is the touchstone of constitutionality. Formally neutral
laws with a disproportionate adverse effect on speakers trigger heightened
scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.24 But formally neutral laws with a
disproportionate adverse effect on adherents of a religion are now reviewed
deferentially under the Free Exercise Clause, 25 unless their formal neutrality is
unmasked as a subterfuge for anti-religious discrimination. 26 Formal
preferences for religious practices or symbols may be upheld against
Establishment Clause challenge when found to have a sanitizing secular
purpose.27 Under the negative implications of the Commerce Clause, the Court
strikes down laws it finds protectionist in purpose.28 The Court has also struck
down laws, regardless of their purpose, that formally discriminate between in-
state and out-of-state interests29 or that, while formally neutral, have a
disproportionate adverse effect on out-of-state interests. 30
broadcast programming merited intermediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny, because it was
aimed at the economic structure of the video market rather than at programming content);
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763 (1994) (upholding, as permissibly
content-neutral in part, an injunction against specified anti-abortion protestors, noting that
"[w]e ... look to the government's purpose as the threshold consideration"); see also Regan
v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550-51 (1983) (holding permissibly
viewpoint-neutral in purpose a facially selective tax benefit for veterans' lobbying
organizations); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983)
(holding permissibly viewpoint-neutral in purpose a facial preference for expression by an
incumbent over a rival union).
24 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding a law banning draft
card destruction against the requirement of a close fit to an important government interest).
25 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
(holding that denials of religions exemptions from generally applicable laws are subject only
to rationality review).
26 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(invalidating ban on ritual animal slaughter as impermissibly aimed at suppressing Santeria
worship service).
2 7 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding public placement of a
Christmas nativity scene); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding legislative
prayer); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws).
2 8 See, e.g., Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1928)
(invalidating a state law requiring in-state processing of exported shrimp on grounds of its
"purpose" to favor local business).
29 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978) (invalidating
state ban on waste importation on grounds that whatever the law's purpose, "the evil of
protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends").
30 See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)
(invalidating state apple grading law that effectively gerrymandered Washington apples out of
the state market); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (requiring facially neutral
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In short, while form, purpose, and effect sometimes point in the same
direction, either for or against the constitutionality of a law, they sometimes
diverge, and the Court has not been consistent in according them lexical
priority. Now consider the form-purpose-effect problem in the context of equal
protection law. The analysis that currently governs this area of the law would
appear to be something like the following: the equal protection guarantee is
presumptively violated-that is, the government is put to the test of strict
scrutiny-only when there is racially discriminatory purpose and effect.31 A
law racially neutral in form, but racially disproportionate in impact, is not
subject to strict review unless revealed through direct or circumstantial evidence
to have a racially discriminatory purpose.32 But laws that are racially
discriminatory in form tend to be presumed racially discriminatory in purpose
and effect, and hence subject to strict scrutiny. 33 This holds true despite a
generation of argument that purpose, not form, should be determinative, and
that benign racial discrimination should be distinguished from that aimed at the
impermissible purpose of racial subordination. 34 In this respect, constitutional
state laws with a disproportionate adverse effect on out-of-state commerce to be justified by
significant state interests). For the view that the dormant Commerce Clause cases are best
understood, regardless of their rhetoric, as aiming at impermissible protectionist purposes, see
Donald Regan, The Supreme Court and Economic Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Donnant Commerce Clause, 84 MicH. L. REv. 1091 (1986).
31 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding a civil service exam with
racially disparate effects in the absence of a showing of racially discriminatory intent); Palmer
v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (upholding municipal pool closure as lacking racially
disparate effect even if motivated by racist resistance to a desegregation order).
32 See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (finding no
racially discriminatory intent in a local government's denial of a zoning variance, but noting
that such purpose might be shown by circumstantial evidence).
33 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229-30 (1995)
(plurality opinion) ("[Wjhenever the government treats any person unequally because of his or
her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of
the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection."). In his concurrence, Justice Thomas stated
"there is a 'moral [and] constitutional equivalence' . . . between laws designed to subjugate a
race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster ... equality." Id.
at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring).
34The tension between an anti-discrimination and an anti-caste reading of the Equal
Protection Clause is as old as the first Justice Harlan's dissent from the separate-but-equal
holding in Plessy v. Ferguson; he stated both that "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind," and that
"there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste
here." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). For examples
of the argument that the Equal Protection Clause should be read as forbidding only racial
discrimination that aims to subordinate or subjugate a racial group, see LAURENCE H. TmhIE,
AMERICAN CONSliIONAL LAW §§ 16-21 (2d ed. 1988); Cass Sunstein, The Anticaste
Principle, 92 MIcH. L. REv. 2410 (1994). For a recent restatement of the view that purpose,
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race discrimination law is like dormant Commerce Clause law, where
discriminatory form triggers a virtual per se rule of invalidity, and unlike free
speech or religion law, where the presumption from form is rebuttable. Unlike
dormant Commerce Clause law, however, it does not accord heightened
scrutiny to laws with disparate effects. 35
Traditional affirmative action, even in the discreet form encouraged by
Bakke, is racially discriminatory in form, at least if that notion is understood, as
the Supreme Court seems to have understood it, as requiring the formal use of
race as a criterion for legal advantage or disadvantage, and not animus or
hostility rooted in notions of racial supremacy or inferiority. Thus, the Court
has no experience in its affirmative action jurisprudence with challenges to
facially neutral laws disproportionately favoring racial minorities; it has yet to
entertain a reverse Washington v. Davis. Questions about the purpose or effect
of such laws have not arisen as they have with respect to laws that
disproportionately disadvantage members of minority groups. But efforts to
employ formally race-neutral criteria of selection that are predicted to operate
as substitutes or partial substitutes for racial criteria, such as Texas's ten percent
solution or the class-based preferences pioneered by UCLA's law school,
would bring such questions to the foreground.
A. Purpose
It might be relatively easy to demonstrate that such programs aim, at least
in part, at increasing the racial diversity of student bodies. In some cases the
evidence might be direct; for example, an institution might confess dismay at
the precipitous drop in minority admissions caused by a ban on the use of racial
criteria and declare that a new method is being adopted in amelioration. In
other cases, policymakers might be coyer in concealing their motives on the
record, but the timing of the change might give rise to an inference that
maintenance of racial diversity was an important objective. Of course,
policymakers might seek to refute such circumstantial evidence, and such
arguments will be more successful the more they shift from approach number
two toward approach number three above-that is, the more they couch their
policy shift in terms of a broad, normative alteration of the university's goals.
not form, is determinative and that only formally racially discriminatory laws "expressing
caste animosity or imposing caste status" have an impermissible purpose, see Jed Rubenfeld,
Affirmative Action, 107 YAL L.J. 427, 461 (1997).
35 Compare Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (Disproportionate impact,
"[s]tanding alone,. . .does not trigger the rule... that racial classifications are to be
subjected to the strictest scrutiny... ."), with Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137
(1970) (subjecting law with a disproportionate effect on out-of-state commerce to heightened
scrutiny).
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For example, Texas might argue that its policy reflects a policy of genuine
geographical diversity rooted in notions of local autonomy over public school
governance. 36  Or the University of California schools employing
socioeconomic preferences in admissions might argue that expanding
opporttmities for social mobility is generally an appropriate goal for public
institutions of higher education. Assume for the moment, though, that at least
some such programs might be found unambiguously race-conscious in their
objectives. 37
But even if a proxy policy is animated by the goal of racial diversity, such a
goal does not necessarily establish a case of impermissible race discrimination.
This proposition should be clear to any true formalist, who would enforce,
under the Equal Protection Clause, only a rule against explicit legal distinctions
on the basis of race. But even those who would peer behind a law's form to its
purposes and predicted effects ought not find proxy policies discriminatory. It is
simply not the case that uncovering a purpose to increase racial diversity, in the
absence of racially discriminatory means, simultaneously reveals a proxy policy
to be a "subterfuge" for discrimination against whites. 38 Rather, consideration
of such policies permits a thought experiment: what happens to the analysis of
affirmative action when racially discriminatory purpose is decoupled from
racially discriminatory form? Put another way, is the purpose of increasing
racial diversity itself racially discriminatory if race is not used as the legal
trigger for the allocation of burden or benefit?
The most global argument against this proposition is simply that the Equal
Protection Clause embodies an anti-caste rather than an anti-discrimination
principle. 39 From this point of view, racially discriminatory purpose is defined
as a purpose to subordinate the race disadvantaged by a law. Thus, strict
scrutiny of facially race-neutral laws is appropriate only when impermissible
racial animus or supremacism can be distilled from behind their neutral
masks-for example, as an inference from grossly disproportionate racial
36 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding
unequal per capita financing of local public education based partly on the importance of local
control of public schools).
37 If the program were enacted for race-neutral reasons-that is, despite rather than
because of its racial impact-the disproportionate impact on whites would not give rise to
strict scrutiny. Cf. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (upholding
veterans' preference in civil service positions as neutrally motivated despite the fact that the
beneficiary class was 98% male).
38 For an example of such a mistaken argument, see Chapin Cimino, Note, Class-Based
Preferences in Affirmative Action Programs After Miller v. Johnson: A Race-Neutral Option,
or Subterfuge?, 64 U. Cm. L. REv. 1289 (1997).
39 See supra note 34.
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effects. 4° No such supremacist purpose is present, according to the anti-caste
view, when racial integration and diversity are the motivating principles behind
a law. I am entirely sympathetic to such an approach. But since the Court has
repeatedly declined to embrace this interpretation of equal protection, it is
worth asking whether an argument can be made, independent of the anti-caste
principle, for the constitutionality of formally neutral efforts aimed at increasing
racial diversity. The following is a brief sketch of such an argument:
First, while holding that it is impermissible to disadvantage a person on the
basis of race, the Court has never said that it is impermissible to take race into
account in government policymaking. The view that mere advertence to race is
per se discriminatory would jeopardize a variety of familiar governmental
practices that take race into account, from racial record keeping in the national
census to parental expression of preference for a same-race child in applying
for a publicly brokered adoption.41 Indeed, the Court has not held that even a
racially discriminatory purpose automatically invalidates a law. For example, in
allowing whites, even in the absence of vote dilution, to challenge congressional
districts drawn to include a majority of minority-race voters, the Court has held
that race must not be the "predominant" factor in the legislature's decision, but
has been careful to note that this does not mean that race-consciousness must be
wholly purged from the districting process. 42 Similarly, outside of the voting
context, the fact that a facially race-neutral law is motivated in part by a racially
discriminatory purpose does not by itself trigger strict scrutiny; such a purpose
must be the law's but-for cause.43 Thus, some constitutional latitude exists for
40 See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229, 233 (1985) (invalidating
disenfranchisement of persons convicted of crimes of moral turpitude where such a provision,
enacted when a "zeal for white supremacy ran rampant," had the effect of eliminating ten
times as many black as white voters from the rolls); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,
341, 347 (1960) (invalidating municipal redistricting as racial gerrymander where it fenced
out of the city all but "four or five of its 400 Negro voters while not removing a single white
resident").
41 For an argument that racial preferences in fact should not be entertained in public
adoptions, see Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents' Racial
Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875 (1998).
4 2 See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996) ("Strict scrutiny does not apply
merely because redistricting is performed with consciousness of race. Nor does it apply to all
cases of intentional creation of majority-minority districts."); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 916 (1995) ("Redistricting legislatures will... almost always be aware of racial
demographics, but it does not follow that race predominates in the redistricting process.");
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) ("This Court has never held that race-conscious
state decisionmaking is impermissible in all circumstances.").
43 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270
n.21 (1977) (noting that proof of a racially discriminatory motive merely shifts the burden to
the government to show that "the same decision would have resulted even had the
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state advertence to race and race-based distinctions. Racially discriminatory
purpose in the air does not condemn a law; it must first attach itself to an act of
discrimination. 44
Second, the goal of increasing the racial diversity of a group of people
organized by a government policy does not automatically entail a purpose to
harm or to single out on a racial basis any member of the group whose relative
share is decreased, in the case of a shared benefit, or increased, in the case of a
shared burden. The two are not the obverse of one another, like flip sides of a
coin; rather, there is some distance between them.
For example, the federal government might decide to draft troops by lottery
in time of war rather than allow a volunteer army with a disproportionately high
minority membership to bear the burden; a white draftee would not likely get
very far with a race discrimination claim. The goal would be the fair
distribution of burdens, and the increased incidence of burden on whites is a
mere by-product of that goal. But even if an additional goal were to eliminate
the reality or symbolism of racial exploitation, it entails no purpose to harm
white conscripts-assuming, as the Court has, that knowledge of probable
effects is not sufficient to establish purpose.45
Or the federal government might require states to allow voter registration
as an adjunct to motor vehicle registration and driver licensing, consciously
intending to increase the share of racial minorities registered to vote as well as
to maximize total registration. Again, a white voter cannot plausibly claim to
have been the target of race discrimination in such a scheme.
The problem with white claims of discrimination in such examples is not
simply that any injury to whites is generalized or diffuse. 46 Rather, the problem
is that the effects on whites are simply incidental to the government's concerns
and there is no background entitlement to a disproportionately low share of a
burden (combat exposure) or large share of a benefit (voting power) based on
one's race. The government action is taken despite, rather than because of, the
effect on white interests. 47 In a counterfactual world where the government
impermissible purpose not been considered").
44 Cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding that selective medical insurance
"may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative," but did not entail discrimination
against the right to abortion).
45 See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
46 The racial redistricting cases, to take one example, discounted such objections. See
Bush, 517 U.S. at 952; Miller, 515 U.S. at 900; Shaw, 509 U.S. at 630.
47 Cf Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-
Shaw Era, 26 Cuim. L. REv. 287, 292 (1996) (arguing that the racial redistricting decisions
wrongly treat white voters who reside in majority-minority districts as having "suffered a
racial classification," for "[tihe race of these 'filler people' is irrelevant: whether they are
white, Asian, I-ispanic, or purple with green spots has no bearing on their assignment to a
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expressly sought to injure whites, this argument might falter, but such injury is
certainly not a necessary, or even plausible, inference from the structure of
such laws in the absence of direct evidence of such intent.
One might object that the racial redistricting decisions actually foreclose
this line of argument because they allow white equal protection claims even
where the express and plausible legislative goal is to ensure the satisfaction of
black voter preferences or to increase black representation in Congress, not to
harm white interests. But these goals differ in important ways from the goal of
racial diversity in university admissions. Because they focus on outputs, these
goals assume that black voters vote monolithically, favoring black legislators.
This raises a specter of group-based stereotyping48 that is not presented by race-
based preferences in university admissions. To the contrary, the pedagogical
function of racial diversity rests rather on the premise that experience will vary
by race even if interests, desires, and preferences might not, and that, as Justice
Powell's Bakke opinion suggested, such experience will enrich classroom
debate and discussion.49 Under this view, a young Clarence Thomas and a
young Thurgood Marshall would equally contribute race-specific experiential
perspective to a university setting no matter how diametrically opposed their
normative views. In the education setting, racial experience is merely an input,
not a predictor of any particular discursive outcome. This is so whether the
function of education is understood as simply the pursuit of knowledge or as a
kind of civic enculturation as well. 50
Note that compensatory justifications for race-based preferences arguably
do entail singling out displaced whites for racial harm in a way that racial
diversity justifications do not. Compensatory justifications proceed from a
baseline of unjust enrichment, seeking to disgorge white privilege that would
particular district"). But see John Hart Ely, Standing to Challenge Pro-Minority
Gerrymanders, 111 HARv. L. REv. 576, 595 (1997) ("To favor pro-minority gerrymanders
and at the same time deny the filler people standing to challenge them is to engage in a
profound inconsistency. ... ").
48 See, e.g., Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647 (noting that race-based districting "reinforces the
perception that members of the same racial group... think alike, share the same political
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls"); cf. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Ilhe Constitution provides that the
Government may not allocate benefits and burdens among individuals based on the
assumption that race or ethnicity determines how they act or think.").
49 But cf Jim Chen, Diversity in a Different Dimension: Evolutionary Theory and
Affirmative Action's Destiny, 59 Omio ST. L.J. 811 (1998).50 For variations on the view that education is an adjunct to democratic citizenship, see
Rachel Moran, Diversity, Distance, and the Delivery of Higher Education, 59 Ofio ST. L.J.
775 (1998); Akthil Amar & Neal Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1745 (1996);
Nathan Glazer, In Defense of Preference, NEw REPuBLIc, Apr. 6, 1998, at 18.
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not have existed but for past discrimination. A compensatory transfer of a
benefit differs from a redefinition of the criteria by which the benefit will be
allocated in the first place. Where no compensatory rationale is advanced, it is
difficult to argue that a race-conscious program is intended primarily, or even
partially, to disadvantage whites.
B. Effect
Just as the use of race-neutral form precludes any conclusive presumption
of racially discriminatory purpose, so too it precludes any conclusive
presumption of racially discriminatory effect. Individual whites might be able to
demonstrate that programs such as the Texas ten percent solution and the
UCLA experiment with socioeconomic preferences diminish their ex ante
chances of admission as compared with the prior system or some alternative
possible admissions policy. They will face two problems nonetheless.
First, individual whites may have a difficult time showing that they lost any
discrete opportunity to a member of a racial minority group, the type of claim
made by Alan Bakke. This will be increasingly true as inefficiency of the
chosen policy at generating racial diversity becomes greater. The more whites
from lower socioeconomic backgrounds or inferior high schools swept in by the
race-neutral proxy, the less salient any white applicant's claim to have suffered
racial discrimination will be. Still, it might well be possible to demonstrate that,
under some such programs, white admissions will fall and minority admissions
will rise as a percentage of the total, as compared with alternative admissions
policies.
The second, deeper problem is conceptual. The baseline from which these
adverse effects are to be measured is simply the prior admissions system or
some alternative to that system. This baseline is entirely contingent, an artifact
of a particular conception of a college's or university's social function at a
particular moment. If the polity wants its higher education system to do more to
serve the goals of geographical representation or class mobility, it may do so
even if that alters relative racial shares in that system. Among alternative
admission policies that are race-neutral in form, no one in particular is
constitutionally compelled over any other. Thus, it is not clear that loss of a
group share, or an individual group member's probability of admission, as
compared with any other race-neutral alternative, constitutes a racially
discriminatory effect.
It might be objected that this argument proves too much. It might be argued
that there are no constitutionally compelled baselines and, thus, that all equal
protection claims concern relative rather than absolute deprivations. Literacy
tests and poll taxes, for example, are barred in state elections even though the
Federal Constitution nowhere guarantees the right to vote in state elections. The
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answer to this objection must be that not all relative deprivations count equally
seriously for equal protection purposes. Voting is fundamentally important;
other public opportunities are not. Legislatures could not function if all
predictably disproportionate effects constituted actionable discrimination. For
example, suppose a public college decided to reallocate athletic scholarships
from basketball and baseball to tennis and golf, consciously fully intending that
the relative share of white scholarships will increase as a percentage of the total.
Should the artifactual quality of the athletic scholarship allocation as between
team and individual sports preclude a race discrimination claim by minority
student athletes? Anti-caste advocates would likely say no, reasoning that
retrogression in minority shares of a benefit is suspect in a way that
retrogression in white shares is not. But the Court, which has rejected the anti-
caste view, might well embrace symmetrical outcomes: the disproportionate
racial impact of a reallocation of relative shares, where there is no background
entitlement to any particular share, does not necessarily constitute a racially
discriminatory effect.51
HI. CONCLUSION
Opponents of affirmative action would do well to remember the adage that
you should beware what you wish for, for your wish might come true. Bans on
the modest and contained race-based preferences that Bakke authorized in
university admissions might shift political energies into attempts to find crude
proxies for race in race-neutral criteria, such as geography or class, that will
alter traditional admissions criteria, or even to rewrite the criteria of academic
"merit" altogether. The prospect of admissions criteria that are race-neutral in
form but are intended disproportionately to favor minorities invites an intriguing
51 This point raises a more general issue about government market participation and
affirmative action. When a government acts as a market participant, it is sometimes wholly
immunized from anti-discrimination principles, see, e.g., South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91-93 (1984) (reviewing the market participant exception to the ban
on interstate discrimination inferred from the Commerce Clause), and sometimes at least
partially immunized from anti-discrimination principles, see, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173, 194 (1991) (holding that government speech subsidies may discriminate on the basis of
content, if not viewpoint, because "when the government appropriates public funds to
establish a program, it is entitled to define the limits of that program"). The Court has simply
ignored this principle in the context of equal protection challenges to affirmative action
programs. For example, neither Croson nor Adarand gave the government any discount on
scrutiny despite the fact that each involved a wholly gratuitous procurement program. The
reason may well be that equal protection limits the government's use of racial criteria in both
its sovereign and proprietary capacities in a way the negative implications of the Commerce
Clause or the anti-censorship principle of the Free Speech Clause do not. But in the thought
experiment under discussion here, the government is not using racial criteria.
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thought experiment: should the goal of increasing racial diversity trigger
constitutional skepticism when decoupled from race-specific means?
Strong arguments suggest that it should not. The purpose of achieving
racial diversity, standing alone, does not entail a purpose to classify whites on
the basis of their race or to make them targets of race-based harm. Any
alteration in relative white shares of public burdens or benefits is a mere by-
product. Thus, race-neutral proxy devices for seeking racial diversity should
not be understood at the outset as implicating a racially discriminatory purpose.
Nor should they be understood as implicating racially discriminatory effects.
Racially disproportionate effects in relation to contingent baselines-that is,
initial allocations to which one has no fixed entitlement-are not automatically
racially discriminatory.
But if these propositions are correct, then it is difficult to see why any
public university ought to be compelled to shift in the first place from Bakke-
type policies to race-neutral policies that produce the goal of racial diversity less
efficiently. If racial diversity is not an invidious government end, then policies
that confer explicit race preferences in form should not be conclusively
presumed to be racially discriminatory in purpose. It would seem perverse to
require, as a matter of constitutional law, that a permissible goal be sought by
the least efficient alternative means.
What, then, is the possible social gain in shifting from Bakke to proxies?
The only possible answer would be that explicit race preferences cause
symbolic or expressive harms, akin to the expressive harms Justice O'Connor
has emphasized in the race-based redistricting cases52 and her Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. 53 But it is difficult to see how symbolic gains from such a
shift could be measured, or found to offset the material costs.
52 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) ("[We believe that
reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter ... .").
53 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(noting that the harm in government endorsement of religion is that it "sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community").
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